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Although Congress enacted legislation in 1974 to prohibit
predispute arbitration agreements, the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) has adopted a regulation allowing
predispute arbitration agreements if customers are given the
warning prescribed by the Commission. Since the 1974 legisla-
tion, some federal courts have refused to defer to the jurisdiction
of the CFTC. The regulation adopted by the Commission and the
cases refusing to defer to the jurisdiction of the Commission
threaten to nullify the intent of Congress that arbitration be vol-
untary.
INTRODUCTION
With the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 19741
(CFTC Act of 1974), the Commodity Exchange Act2 underwent its
first comprehensive revision since 1936.3 One of the most contro-
* Member, State Bars of California and Colorado. LLB., University of Colo-
rado, 1959.
1. Pub. I No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-22 (1976)).
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
3. Federal regulation of commodity futures markets dates from 1922 when
Congress enacted the Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 1, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (current
version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2-22 (1976)), to prevent manipulation of commodity futures
markets. Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of the Commodities Exchange
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versial innovations of the CFTC Act of 1974 concerns the forum in
which brokers and customers can litigate disputes over commod-
ity futures contracts.
4
One might think that the issue of the forum in which a dispute
between a broker and a customer should be decided would be
merely a question of different procedures. In fact, winning or los-
ing can depend on the forum in which a dispute is decided.5
Thus, the most intensely litigated issues will often revolve around
the forum in which the case will be decided.
The traditional forum for broker-customer disputes was arbitra-
tion, either before an exchange arbitration panel or before the
and the National Securities Exchanges, 38 GEO. WASH. L REv. 223 (1969). The
Grain Futures Act was amended in 1936 and its name changed to the Commodity
Exchange Act-the name of the act under which commodity futures markets are
regulated today. Ch. 545, § 1, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22
(1976)).
4. A commodity futures contract is a contract in which there are two parties,
a seller and a buyer. The seller promises to deliver a commodity at a future date,
hence "futures" contract. The buyer promises to accept delivery of a commodity.
See generally S. ANGRIST, SENSIBLE SPECULATING IN COMMoDrrTES (1972); H. BAx-
KEN, FUTURES TRADING IN LIVESTOCK (1970); G. GOLD, MODERN COMMODITY FU-
TURES TRADING (1959); B. GOULD, Dow JONEs-IRwin GUIDE TO COMMODITIES
TRADING (1973); T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FUTURES TRADING (1971); C.
KELTNER, How To MAKE MONEY IN COMMODITIES (1960); S. KROLL & I. SHISKO. THE
COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET GUIDE (1973); R. TEWELES, C. HARLOW & H. STONE,
THE CoMmODIT FUTURES GAME (1974).
The quantity, quality, and delivery terms of commodity futures contracts are
standardized and stated in rules and regulations of the exchanges on which a con-
tract is traded. Delivery dates are at specified monthly intervals.
The performance of commodity futures is secured by money or other property
called "margin." Margin is required to be deposited and maintained at minimum
levels prescribed by exchanges. Because commodity futures contracts are stan-
dardized and performance is secured, performance does not depend on the
finances of the individuals. This imparts a fungibility to commodity futures con-
tracts. Jones & Cook, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 5
MINN. ST. U.L. REv. 457, 460 (1975).
Price is the only negotiated term in a commodity futures contract. Price must
be negotiated by brokers who are members of an exchange on which a contract is
traded. Commodity Exchange Act § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1977 Supp.). Commodity fu-
tures contracts must also be executed by open bidding. Commodity Exchange Act
§ 4b, (D), 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1976). 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1978). See Julian M. Marks, 20 Agric.
Dec. 173 (1961).
This bidding takes place on the floors of exchanges at areas called "pits" or
"rings." Orders are transmitted to floor brokers who bid with other floor brokers
for execution of orders. After a customer's order is executed or "filled," the broker
sends his customer a statement confirming the execution of the order. This confir-
mation statement will be the only documentation of the execution of a customer's
contract. Because commodity futures contracts are standardized, customers do
not execute written contracts.
5. "[A]rbitration, whatever its merit or shortcomings, substantially affects
the cause of action created .... The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is
an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change
from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ulti-
mate result." Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
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American Arbitration Association (AAA). Generally, brokerage
firms required customers to agree to arbitrate all future contro-
versies. These arbitration agreements were enforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act, applicable to contracts involving
transactions in interstate commerce.6 Unless a customer could
muster grounds for defeating an arbitration agreement, customers
were bound by arbitration agreements to submit all controversies
with their brokers to arbitration.
7
Congress passed the CFTC Act of 1974 to "break the chains" of
arbitration agreements. The first innovation concerning forum in
the CFTC Act of 1974 is a provision that opened the courtroom
door to customers by requiring that arbitration agreements be
voluntary.8
On November 24, 1975, the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) proposed Regulation section 180.3 to implement
the mandate of the CFTC Act of 1974 that arbitration be volun-
tary.9 The proposed regulation prohibited brokerage firms from
entering into predispute arbitration agreements with customers.
The prohibition of predispute arbitration agreements provoked
criticism from commodity futures brokers and from the AAA.10
The CFTC reacted to this criticism by adopting a rule that allows
brokers to bind customers to predispute arbitration agreements
6. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). See M. DomKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMER-
CrAL ARBrrRATION §§ 4.01, .03 (1968). More than one-half of the states have statutes
making enforceable arbitration agreements of future disputes. See D. DOBBS,
REMEDIES 937-38 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bache & Co., 227 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
8. The CFTC Act of 1974 provides in § 209 that each commodity futures mar-
ket shall
provide a fair and equitable procedure through arbitration or otherwise
for the settlement of customers' claims and grievances against any mem-
ber or employee thereof: Provided, That (i) the use of such procedure by a
customer shall be voluntary, (ii) the procedure shall not be applicable to
any claim in excess of $15,000, (iii) the procedure shall not result in any
compulsory payment except as agreed upon between the parties, and (iv)
the term "customer" as used in this subsection shall not include a futures
commission merchant or a floor broker.
7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (1976).
9. 40 Fed. Reg. 54,430, 54,435 (1975). Part 180.3(a) stated that
[t]he use by customers of the procedure established by a contract market
pursuant to the Act shall be voluntary. In that connection the procedure
established shall prohibit any agreement or understanding pursuant to
which customers agree to submit claims or grievances for settlement
under the procedure so established prior to the time when the claim or
grievance arose.
10. 41 Fed. Reg. 27,526 (1976).
provided customers are given a bold-faced caveat prescribed by
the Commission."
The second innovation concerning forum in the CFTC Act of
1974 is a provision that opened the CFTC itself as a forum. The
Act permits a customer to initiate a proceeding before the CFTC
to seek reparation for losses caused by a violation of the Com-
modity Exchange Act.12
In the short time that the CFTC Act of 1974 has been on the
books, the courts have decided several cases dealing with the con-
test over forum. Some courts have shown a reluctance to defer to
the jurisdiction of the CFTC. As a consequence, a conflict is de-
veloping between the jurisdiction of the courts and that of the
CFTC.
This article first outlines arbitration agreements prior to the
CFTC Act of 1974. It then considers the implications of section
180.3. Finally, the article analyzes the developing jurisdictional
conflict between the courts and the CFTC and suggests a solution
to the problem.
11. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1978). The caveat prescribed by the regulation states:
WHILE THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
(CFTC) RECOGNIZES THE BENEFITS OF SETTLING DISPUTES BY
ARBITRATION, IT REQUIRES THAT YOUR CONSENT TO SUCH AN
AGREEMENT BE VOLUNTARY. YOU NEED NOT SIGN THIS AGREE-
MENT TO OPEN AN ACCOUNT WITH [name]. See 17 CFR 180.1-180.6.
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU MAY BE WAIVING YOUR
RIGHT TO SUE IN A COURT OF LAW, BUT YOU ARE NOT WAIVING
YOUR RIGHT TO ELECT AT A LATER DATE TO PROCEED PURSU-
ANT TO SECTION 14 OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT TO
SEEK DAMAGES SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF A VIOLATION OF
THE ACT. IN THE EVENT A DISPUTE ARISES, YOU WILL BE NOTI-
FIED IF [name] INTENDS TO SUBMIT THE DISPUTE TO ARBITRA-
TION. IF YOU BELIEVE A VIOLATION OF THE COMMODITY
EXCHANGE ACT IS INVOLVED AND IF YOU PREFER TO REQUEST
A SECTION 14 'REPARATIONS' PROCEEDING BEFORE THE CFTC,
YOU WILL STILL HAVE 45 DAYS IN WHICH TO MAKE THAT ELEC-
TION.
An agreement which does not comply with this form is ineffective. Wanty v.
Sprow f Current Binder] Com. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,548 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
12. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (a)-(i) (1976). Subsection (a) provides:
Any person complaining of any violation of any provision of this chapter
or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder by any person registered
under section 6d, 6e, 6j, or 6m of this title may, at any time within two
years after the cause of action accrues, apply to the Commission by peti-
tion, which shall briefly state the facts, whereupon, if, in the opinion of the
Commission, the facts therein contained warrant such action, a copy of
the complaint thus made shall be forwarded by the Commission to the re-
spondent, who shall be called upon to satisfy the complaint, or to answer
it in writing, within a reasonable time to be prescribed by the Commis-
sion.
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ARBrrRATION AGREEMENTS BEFORE THE CFTC ACT OF 1974
Exchange Arbitration
The Arbitration Panel
Before the CFTC Act of 1974, the first and decisive issue in cus-
tomer-broker controversies was whether a customer could be
compelled to arbitrate his dispute with a broker. Arbitration
agreements were ensconced in form contracts that could run to as
many as twenty paragraphs of fine print. Typically, a customer
agreed to submit all future controversies which might arise be-
tween the customer and the brokerage firm to arbitration. Arbi-
tration agreements permitted election by the customer of
arbitration either by the procedure of the exchange on which the
transaction was executed, by the procedure of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), or by the procedure of the AAA. If the
customer did not elect within five days after his brokerage firm re-
quested him to do so, the brokerage firm could elect the proce-
dure to be followed.'
3
These arbitration agreements appeared innocuous but were a
pitfall for customers. Customers seldom struggled through the
fine print of the form contracts they were given to sign when they
opened an account. Even if a customer read the arbitration agree-
ment in his contract, he probably did not know what he had to do
to protect his rights. If, as a consequence of not knowing what to
do, a customer did nothing, he could lose any claim he had.
Although customers often failed to act, brokerage firms did not
fail to act. Brokerage firms elected arbitration by an exchange
procedure because the arbitrators were brokers. However, the ar-
13. An example of such an agreement provides that:
Any controversy between you and the undersigned arising out of or re-
lating to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
in accordance with the rules, then obtaining, of either the American Arbi-
tration Association, or the Board of Arbitration of the New York Stock Ex-
change, or any other organized market or Board of Trade or exchange of
which you are a member and upon which the transaction was executed, as
the undersigned may elect. If the undersigned does not make such elec-
tion by registered mail addressed to you at your main office within five (5)
days after receipt of notification from you requesting such election, then
the undersigned authorizes you to make such election in behalf of the un-
dersigned. Any arbitration hereunder shall be before at least three arbi-
trators and the award of the arbitrators, or of a majority of them, shall be
final, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court,
state or federal, having jurisdiction.
M. Doaixx, supra note 6, § 5.04.
bitration agreements did not state that under exchange arbitra-
tion procedure the arbitrators would be brokers.
Commodity exchange arbitration occurred before a committee
of exchange members. Customers had no choice of arbitrators.14
The arbitration procedure of the NYSE allowed customers to
elect to have three of the five arbitrators appointed from a panel
of persons who were not brokers.15 The Board of Directors of the
NYSE appointed this panel;16 the customer had no say in who
was chosen. Thus, arbitration panels of brokers, or of brokers and
persons appointed by brokers, decided claims of customers
against brokers.
Many persons who sat on exchange arbitration panels undoubt-
edly tried to be impartial. However, one would be naive to believe
that brokers were not biased in favor of their fellow brokers. For
those in the same business or profession to empathize with one of
their own in a conflict with an outsider is human nature.'7 Never-
theless, a customer could not avoid arbitration on the ground of
bias.18
Because arbitration agreements did not state that exchange ar-
bitration would be before brokers, most customers probably as-
sumed that the arbitration panel would be impartially composed.
By the time they realized that it would not be, it was too late to
do anything about it. A customer caught by an agreement that
compelled him to submit his claim to arbitration before an ex-
change found himself in a predicament. Instead of litigating his
claim before his peers in his own community, he faced a trip to
Chicago or to New York to submit his claim to a panel of brokers.
If a customer was poor, or if his claim was small, the expense of
travel and lodging for him, for his attorney, and for an expert wit-
ness could be enough to deter his claim.19
14. E.g., Rule 180 of the Chicago Board of Trade; Rule 501 of the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange; Sec. 6.03 of the Rules of the New York Cotton Exchange.
15. [19791 NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CONSTrrTION AND RULES (CCH)
T 2484, at 4127 (Rule 484 of the Board of Directors).
16. Id. 1354, at 1071-2 to 1071-3, 1 1356, at 1071-3 to 1072 (NYSE Const., art.
VIII, §§ 4,6).
17. See PROFESSIONAL NEGUGENCE 5 (T. Roady & W. Anderson eds. 1960).
18. See, e.g., Tamari v. Bache & Co., 565 F.2d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir. 1977); Arrieta
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 3d 322, 329-30, 130 Cal. Rptr.
534, 538 (1976); Feldman, Arbitration Law in California: Private Tribunals for Pri-
vate Government, 30 S. CAT L. REV. 375, 449 (1957).
19. One person familiar with exchange arbitration has observed that custom-
ers are deterred from arbitration by the inability to pay the filing fee prescribed by
an exchange. New York Chamber of Commerce, The Disputed Transaction: How
Arbitration Is Used in the Securities Industry 8 (1967) (statement of H. Vernon
Lee).
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No Discovery in Arbitration
Arbitration agreements were part of form contracts prepared by
brokerage firms. These form contracts never provided for discov-
ery.20 Unless an arbitration agreement provides for discovery,
generally no right to discovery on the merits exists.2 1 Likewise,
the arbitration rules of exchanges did not provide for discovery.
22
One attorney described arbitration as "a throw back to the system
of surprise at trial."23
Customers often needed discovery to prove their claims. For
example, a customer seeking to prove that a broker caused his ac-
count to be traded excessively ("churned") would need evidence
of the amount of trading of other accounts to compare with his ac-
count.24 Similarly, a customer might need evidence from a
brokerage firm employee beyond the reach of subpoena. Without
the aid of discovery, the customer was limited to proving a case
on the basis of evidence he already had.
The General Submission Agreement
Arbitrators derive their authority from the agreement referring
a dispute to arbitration, called a "submission agreement."25 The
aspect of exchange arbitration that provoked the most criticism
was the absolute authority arbitrators had under submission
agreements.26 A general submission agreement defines neither
the issues to be decided nor the way the issues are to be decided,
but gives arbitrators plenary power in deciding all rights in dis-
pute.2 7
20. See NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, A PRIER ON BROKERAGE OPERA-
TIONS 16 (1973) for the standard form of agreement
21. See Mississippi Power Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 69 F.R.D. 558, 566 (S.D.
Miss. 1976); M. DOMKE, supra note 6, at 265, 271.
22. E.g., Rules 180-99 of Chicago Board of Trade; Rules 500-09 of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange; Sees. 6.01-.03 of Rules of New York Cotton Exchange.
23. New York Chamber of Commerce, The Disputed Transaction: How Arbi-
tration Is Used in the Securities Industry 46-47 (1967) (statement of Robert Lun-
ney).
24. See, e.g., Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir.
1970).
25. See M. DOmKE, supra note 6, at 99; J. REDMAN, LAW OF ARBITRATIONS AND
AwARDS 1 (4th ed. 1903).
26. See, e.g., E. BRODSKY, GuIDE TO SEcuRrrIEs LITIGATION 303 (1974); Com-
ment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L REV. 120, 129 (1977).
27. See Marchant v. Mead-Morrison lvfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386, atd,
226 App. Div. 397, 235 N.Y.S. 370 (1929); J. MORSE, LAw OF ARBITRATION AND AwARD
5 (1902); J. REDMAN, LAW OF ARBITRATIONS A AWARDS 79 (4th ed. 1903).
Arbitrators deciding a controversy submitted on a general sub-
mission have virtually unlimited discretion.28 Consequently, they
are not bound to decide a controversy in conformity with law but
may decide it on broad principles of justice and equity.29 Further-
more, an award decided under a general submission cannot be at-
tacked on the basis of errors on the law or on the facts.30 Even if
it were possible to set aside an arbitration award tainted with er-
ror, a general submission makes it virtually impossible to show
such an error 3' because arbitrators deciding a controversy on a
general submission are not required to state reasons for their de-
cision.32
Most agreements to submit future controversies to arbitration
are general submission agreements. 33 Consider, then, what a cus-
tomer in a dispute faced. A customer who had been caught up in
exchange arbitration faced the prospect of having his claim
against a broker being decided by brokers. If arbitration was
before a NYSE panel, his claim would be decided by brokers or a
mixed panel of brokers and persons appointed by brokers if a cus-
tomer was alert enough to choose to have nonbrokers on his
panel. Arbitrators did not have to decide according to the law.
They had no duty to state reasons for a decision, and errors of law
or fact could not be reviewed.
How did customers fare in exchange arbitration? How did the
28. In Muldow v. Norris, 2 Cal. 74, 77 (1872), the court rather elegantly stated:
[U]nder a general submission, arbitrators have power to decide upon the
law and facts: and a mere mistake of law cannot be taken advantage of.
The arbitrators are not bound to award, on principles of dry law, but may
decide on principles of equity and good conscience, and make their award
ex aequo et bono.
29. See, e.g., Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 523, 212 P.2d 233, 239 (1949); Cro-
foot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 186, 260 P.2d 156, 172 (1953); Ever-
ett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 198 N.Y.S. 462 (1923).
30. In Wilkins v. Allen, 169 N.Y. 494, 496-97, 62 N.E. 575, 576 (1902), the court
stated that-
The award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment
either as to the law or as to the facts. If he keeps within his jurisdiction,
and is not guilty of fraud, corruption, or other misconduct affecting his
award, it is unassailable, operates as a final and conclusive judgment, and
... the parties must abide by it.
See also Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Orion Shipping and Trading Co. v.
Eastern States Petroleum Corp., 312 F.2d 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1963); Jones v. Kvistad,
19 Cal. App. 3d 836, 97 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1971); Underhill v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns.
Ch. 340 (N.Y. 1817).
31. See M. DoMKE, supra note 6, at 260; Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Bro-
ker Disputes, 65 CAin. L. REv. 120, 129 (1977).
32. See Case v. Alperson, 181 Cal. App. 2d 757, 761, 5 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1960)
("It is not incumbent on the arbitrators to make findings of fact, to give reasons
back of their award, nor to tell how it was reached"); W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL
ARBIrrATION AND AwARDs 533-34 (1930).
33. See M. DoMKEc, supra note 6, at 44, 47. See, e.g., [1979] NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, INC., CONsTrrTrON AND RULES (CCH) 2492A, at 4129-4131.
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Christians fare with the lions? No one can demonstrate how cus-
tomers fared because no written decisions exist. Considering the
affinity brokerage firms had for exchange arbitration, however,
one might suspect that customers did not fare well.34 However,
once in a while one caught a glimpse of what happened behind
closed doors. One such glimpse came from the notorious case of
Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co.35 The customer submitted to a
NYSE arbitration panel a dispute involving, among other issues,
charges against his broker of market manipulation, secret payoffs
to securities salesmen in return for stock recommendations, and
the creation of false markets. The arbitrators dismissed the cus-
tomer's claim. They stated no reason for their decision-the gen-
eral submission agreement required none. After the dismissal,
the customer's broker entered a guilty plea to criminal charges in-
volving the same misconduct upon which the customer had based
his arbitration claim.
The customer sought to have the arbitrators state the reasons
for their decision, no doubt as a preliminary step to attacking the
decision. Despite the broker's admitted plea of guilty, the cus-
tomer was unable to compel the arbitrators to state a basis for
their decision. Because the arbitration had been decided on a
general submission, the court of appeals held that the arbitrators
did not have to state reasons for their decision.
American Arbitration Association Proceedings
AAA Geared Against Deciding Cases on the Basis of Law
Although AAA arbitration is an institution often defended with
a zealousness approaching the defense of motherhood and the
flag, AAA arbitration was actually as deadly for a customer's case
as an exchange arbitration. The pitfall to a customer of arbitrat-
ing a claim before the AAA may have been more subtle than the
pitfall of exchange arbitration. Bias against the customer was in-
herent in AAA arbitration proceedings rather than in the arbitra-
tors themselves.
For many commercial disputes, AAA arbitration is a good
method of resolving controversies. The strengths of AAA arbitra-
tion are its informality and its use of impartial arbitrators who
34. See Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
120, 130 (1977).
35. 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
have expertise in the matter in dispute. In the words of Judge
Learned Hand, "one of the chief advantages of arbitration is that
arbitrators can be chosen who are familiar with the practices and
customs of the calling, and with just such matters as what are
current prices, what is merchantable quality, and what are the
terms of sale, and the like."36 For commercial disputes of the
kind described by Judge Hand, arbitration is better than litigation
because
[tjhe very refinements and complexities of our court machinery often
make it cumbersome and dilatory when applied to controversies involving
simple issues of fact or law. This is especially true in the case when the
issue of fact turns upon expert knowledge as to the nature or quality of
merchandise or the damage consequent upon the failure to perform a con-
tract for its delivery.., which can be better determined by a layman hav-
ing training and experience in a particular trade or business than by a
judge and jury who have not had that training and experience.37
But the virtues of arbitration in deciding many commercial dis-
putes are vices in deciding controversies involving more than the
most rudimentary concepts of law. As with arbitration generally,
AAA arbitrators are not instructed on the law. 38 This lack of in-
struction is consistent with the view that the law should play a
minor part in arbitration.39 In speaking of the difference between
arbitration and litigation one commentator observed that
[i]t isn't "just like the courts." In fact, its strongest points lie in those ar-
eas where it most widely differs from the courts. Arbitration and litigation
have a similar goal. The proceedings of the two processes are somewhat
alike, principally because the arbitration proceeding has been altered to
accommodate the lawyer. In both processes questions of fact pertaining
to the dispute at hand are critical. The major difference is the framework
within which these questions are examined. The rules of law which pro-
vide such a framework in litigation are at most a minor part of the arbitra-
tion process.40
But even more important than the minor role of the law in arbi-
tration generally (and then in deference to lawyers) is that AAA
arbitration is actually geared against deciding disputes on the ba-
sis of law.
36. American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d
448, 450 (2d Cir. 1944).
37. 10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 197 (1923) (state-
ment of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone), reprinted in M. DOMKE, supra note 6, at 11.
38. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting); M. DOMKE, supra note 6, at § 25.06.
39. The court in Everett v. Brown stated that
arbitrators are usually laymen, inexperienced in the technical rules of law,
but usually possessed with a fund of common sense which enables them
to do substantial justice between the parties. To require an arbitrator to
follow the fixed rules of law in arriving at his award would operate to the
defeat of the object of the proceeding.
120 Misc. 349, 351, 198 N.Y.S. 462, 465 (1923).
40. AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASS'N, RESOLviNG BUSINESS DispuTEs 102 (1965),
quoted in M. DomKE, supra note 6, at § 1.01.
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Unless a lawyer happens to be on a panel, arbitrators will have
no legal background. Because AAA arbitrators are given no in-
structions of law, obviously AAA arbitration must be geared
against deciding questions of law. Indeed, AAA arbitrators are
cautioned not to state reasons for their decision so as to discour-
age any judicial review.41 AAA arbitrators are unpaid volunteers.
A practical reason for AAA arbitrations being decided on a gen-
eral submission is that unpaid volunteers are not expected to take
the time or make the effort to state reasons for decisions.42 AAA
arbitrators thus eschew reasoning their decisions in writing, an
intellectual discipline required of judges.
AAA arbitration is stacked against a customer because his case
is typically built on legal principles. A customer's case is a law-
yer's case. Typically, customers contend that a broker has vio-
lated the Commodity Exchange Act or a rule or regulation
promulgated under the Act.43 The Commodity Exchange Act and
the rules promulgated under the Act are basically specialized ap-
plications of the common law to the milieu of commodity futures
trading. The duties of a brokerage firm to a customer are ana-
logues to common law rules of agency, pledges, and deceit.44
In his education, a lawyer must spend only a few hundred
hours reading the law of agency, deceit, and pledges to grasp the
law involved in the typical dispute between a broker and a cus-
41. M. DomKE, supra note 6, at § 29.05.
42. See New York Chamber of Commerce, The Disputed Transaction: How
Arbitration Is Used in the Securities Industry 18 (1967) (statement of Robert Coul-
son, Executive Vice-President, American Arbitration Association).
43. See, e.g., Lincoln Commodity Servs. v. Meade, 558 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1977)
(action based on antifraud rule of 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commod-
ity Servs., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Scott v. Lincolnwood, Inc., [Current Binder]
COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,447 (CFTC 1977) (action based on violation of Rule
1.33a requiring monthly statement to be sent to each customer who has interest in
pooled account); Note, Private Rights of Action for Commodity Futures Investors,
55 B.U.L. REv. 804-26 (1975).
44. See C. MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES 7
(1931). The purpose of the antifraud rules provisions in § 4b of the Act, for exam-
ple, was to incorporate into the Act the agency duties which a broker has toward
his customer. See J. BAER & 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FuTURES
TRADING 261 (1949) (setting forth digest written in 1936 by N.M. Mehl, Administra-
tor of the Commodity Exchange Authority, the agency which regulated commodity
futures markets before the 1974 Act). Furthermore, one cannot really understand
the general antifraud provisions of § 4a, for example, without understanding that a
broker has a common law duty to affirmatively disclose to his customer material
facts concerning a transaction. Cecka v. Beckman & Co., 28 Cal. App. 3d 5, 11, 104
Cal. Rptr. 374, 377 (1972).
tomer. An unpaid volunteer, unschooled and uninstructed in the
law, can hardly grasp the law from a few hours at an arbitration
hearing. The absurdity of law decided by those ignorant of the
law is glossed over by the general submission agreement. The
proponents of arbitration thus know that arbitration would end if
arbitrators were required to state reasons for their decisions. 45
In Wilko v. Swan,46 the United States Supreme Court held that
arbitration agreements that bound customers to arbitrate future
disputes with stockbrokers were invalid as being repugnant to the
rights a customer has under the Securities Act of 1933. The Court
spoke of the inadequacy of arbitration for deciding legal ques-
tions:
Even though the provisions of the Securities Act, advantageous to the
buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in arbitration
compared to judicial proceedings. Determination of the quality of a com-
modity or the amount due under a contract is not the type of issue in-
volved. This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and
knowledge of the alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only deter-
mined but applied by the arbitrators without judicial instructions on the
law.
4 7
The same can be said of the rights of a customer under the Com-
modity Exchange Act.
The Businessman Arbitrator
Not only is the AAA arbitration proceeding geared against de-
ciding cases on the basis of law, the chances are that the concepts
of law that the customer must urge will evoke frowns from his lis-
teners. Most AAA arbitrators are businessmen, accountants,
business lawyers, bankers, or others interested in business and
finance. Most commercial disputes are between two business-
men, but a commodity futures dispute involves a customer versus
a businessman.
A broker has a fiduciary duty to his customer,48 a duty higher
than the "morals of the market place."49 The idea of a business-
45. In Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1215 n.7 (2d Cir. 1972), the
New York Stock Exchange filed an amicus brief contending that written decisions
would mean the end of securities industry arbitration of customer claims.
46. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
47. Id. at 435-36. The Court noted that the United States Arbitration Act con-
tained no provision for judicial determination of legal issues as was found in Eng-
lish law. Id. at 437.
48. See, e.g., In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 103 F.2d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1939).
The court stated: "We find that a spirit of trust and fidelity necessarily pervades
the entire dealing between broker'and customer. This fiduciary relation plus the
nature of the dealing itself, affected as it is by the public interest, has led in each
instance to parallel regulation by the exchanges, legislatures, and Congress."
49. As Judge Cardozo said: "Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
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man having a fiduciary duty to his customer does not square with
the laissezfaire individualism redolent of the 1850s which is the
credo of the American businessman. A customer's case smacks of
consumerism. A businessman may view the Commodity Ex-
change Act and rules and regulations of commodity futures trad-
ing as further instances of governmental interference with private
enterprise.
AAA Arbitration Ideal for Brokers
AAA arbitration is stacked against a customer for the same rea-
son it is stacked in favor of the brokerage firm. AAA arbitration is
ideal for a simplistic, that is, nonlegalistic, view of a dispute. If
the brokerage firm seeks to collect from a customer, it will pre-
sent its case as a simple debt collection-the customer promised
to reimburse a brokerage firm for money advanced by the broker-
age firm and then reneged on his promise. However, if a cus-
tomer seeks to recover from a brokerage firm, the AAA arbitrator
will be impressed that commodity futures trading is risky and
that the customer knew or should have known that it was risky.
This simplistic view of the facts will impress the arbitrator who
will want to get down to "the facts" and will not want to be both-
ered with a lot of legalistic folderol.
50
THE CFTC's VERSION OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The CFTC's Initial Proposal
To inveigle, with a fine-print form contract, a customer into sub-
mitting his controversy with a broker to arbitration before a panel
of brokers struck some people as unfair to customers.5 1 Those
who drafted the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange
Act recognized this unfairness. In 1973, Alex Caldwell, the Ad-
ministrator of the Commodity Exchange Authority, stated that
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place."
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
50. The antagonism of merchants to lawyers and to law courts is a tradition
which goes back to Colonial times. M. Hoawrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AmEmi-
cAN LAw, 1790-1880, at 144-49 (1977). One merchant complained that "a Number of
Pettifoggers are always ready to... puzzell the Laws, which are far from being
explicit with respect to Commerce." LETTER BOOK OF JOHN WATTS 337 (Collec-
tions of the N.Y. Hist. Soc. for 1928), reprinted in id. at 147.
51. Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 899,
903, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (1976).
the practice of compelling customers to submit disputes to arbi-
tration was unfair and that the legislation which the Authority
was backing would prohibit predispute arbitration agreements. 52
Under the influence of Wilko v. Swan,5 3 predispute arbitratioh
agreements were generally thought to be the antithesis of volun-
tary arbitration.54 The purpose of section 5a of the CFTC Act of
1974 was to adopt the Wilko v. Swan prohibition against predis-
pute arbitration agreements. This purpose was seen in the prohi-
bition of predispute arbitration agreements in section 180.3 as
originally proposed.55 The proposed regulation clearly expressed
Congress' intent, but the prohibition of predispute agreements
sorely distressed brokers and the AAA. The outcry raised by
brokerage firms and the AAA persuaded the CFTC that custom-
ers should be bound by predispute arbitration agreements.
Voluntary Means What CFTC Chooses It to Mean
To leap from arbitration agreements that Congress intended to
be "voluntary" to agreements that should bind customers, the
CFTC rationalized that customers' agreements to predispute arbi-
tration could be deemed "voluntary" if the customers were ad-
vised. To make customers' predispute agreements voluntary,
section 180.3 requires that customers be advised in bold-face type
that they do not have to agree to arbitration and that they could
be waiving the right to bring an action in court. A customer's
right to choose not to arbitrate is backed up by a decree 56 against
making customers sign an arbitration agreement as a condition
for opening an account.
The assumption implicit in the section 180.3 caveat is that cus-
tomers will read and understand the statement and thus will be
able to make a choice free of mistake, fraud, or undue influence.
This assumption is a fiction. Customers do not read and study
documents they are handed to sign when they open an account.5 7
Customers glance over the three or four documents they are
handed and sign them.
The typical customer's agreement is one-sided-the customer
52. Discussion with Alex Caldwell (Oct. 1973). It is generally assumed that
the reparations procedure was adopted to avoid the bias of exchange arbitration of
customer disputes. See, e.g., Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Suc-
cessors, 6 HoFsTmRA L. REV. 1, 19 (1977).
53. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
54. Tamari v. Bache & Co., 565 F.2d 1194, 1205-06 (7th Cir. 1977) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
55. 40 Fed. Reg. 54,435 (1975).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(b) (1) (1978).
57. See, e.g., Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 714, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 147, 151 (1975).
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makes all the promises, and the brokerage firm makes no
promises. Customers give up all their rights and receive nothing
in return from brokerage firms. As one court stated: "[Such an
agreement] is totally one-sided for the benefit of the broker. It
lacks consideration, because for this entire parting with his rights
the customer secures no correlative advantage."5 8
Today's typical customer's agreement5 9 was set forth in a trea-
tise published in 1931.60 If customers have been signing such cus-
tomers' contracts for over forty years, one doubts that customers
will suddenly be sufficiently impressed by the section 180.3 caveat
to consult a lawyer; and without legal counsel, the average cus-
tomer will not be able to make an intelligent choice whether to ar-
bitrate. To assume that customers will be able to decide
intelligently whether to choose arbitration by reading the section
180.3 statement is as much a fiction as the presumption that
everyone knows the law. The average customer knows only
vaguely what is involved in the legalese of the caveat. But given
the desire of courts to relieve their crowded calendars, the fiction
implicit in section 180.3 will not make much difference.
61
For a customer to be adequately warned, he should be advised
in language he can easily understand of what he gives up by
choosing arbitration. In response to this suggestion, the CFTC
stated that: "While the Commission is of the view that the legal
implications of the proposed language could be spelled out in all
their ramifications, it would be virtually impossible to do so in
less than several highly technical paragraphs. The result would
be a longer and perhaps more confusing document."62 That it
58. Jones v. De Ronde, 142 Misc. 831, 835, 255 N.Y.S. 505, 509 (1932).
59. See NEW YoRK INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, A PRIER ON BROKERAGE OPERA-
TIONS 16 (1973).
60. See C. MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES 747
(1931).
61. See, e.g., Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 715, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 147, 152 (1975).
62. 41 Fed. Reg. 42,944 (1976).
The observation of Commons is appropriate:
There is naturally always a resistance, on the part of those who make the
authoritative decisions, against any movement requiring these working
rules to be formulated in words and published for the information of alL
It is usually contended by them that the rules are so difficult and complex
that they can be understood only by experts or those who by long training
have become experienced in interpreting them. It was only after a vigor-
ous struggle that the Twelve Tables of the Roman law were published.
The Egyptian priests are said to have formulated a principle of the econ-
would be too difficult to tell a customer what he should know to
be able to make an intelligent decision demonstrates the falsity of
the assumption that by reading the section 180.3 caveat a cus-
tomer's choice will become voluntary. The difficulty of advising
customers of the implications of arbitration, however, was not the
reason the CFTC rejected this proposal.63 The CFTC wanted to
encourage customers to sign arbitration agreements. To explain
to customers the implications of arbitration agreements would not
have encouraged arbitration.
The Effect of the Section 180.3 Caveat
Ironically, the customer now has less choice than he did before
the CFTC undertook to give the customer a voluntary choice. In
the days of the fine-print arbitration agreements, customers had a
sporting chance of avoiding arbitration agreements by proving
grounds for rescission, usually fraud.64 Under section 180.3, the
day of the small-print arbitration agreement is no more. The sec-
tion 180.3 caveat must be stated in large, bold-face print. Further-
more, customers are required to sign a statement that they have
read the caveat and that they either agree or do not agree to arbi-
tration. The bold-face caveat of section 180.3 will make it difficult
for customers to show grounds for rescission.
The CFTC Act of 1974 also takes away the sanctuary of the fed-
eral securities laws. If the controversy arose out of a transaction
in a discretionary account, the account could be considered a "se-
omy of the truth in order to justify their refusal to give out the working
rules which they were privileged to interpret. And much the same doc-
trine is formulated by businessmen, bankers, financiers, politicians, labor
leaders and others who dread the bad use that might be made of the flex-
ible working rules which they administer, or who flatly deny that the rules
are anybody's 'business' but their own.
J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALIM 141 (1957).
63. The pervasiveness of legalistic governmental regulations is probably due
to the unwillingness of lawyers to try to write regulations which can be under-
stood by nonlawyers. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMssiONs 227 (1966).
64. See Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19,
136 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1977) (arbitration clause in lending agreement permitting Mer-
rill Lynch to make discretionary sales and purchases for customer's account); W.
STURGES, COMMERCIAL AnBrrRATION AND AWARDS 217 (1930). The fine-print con-
tracts customers were generally required to sign when they opened accounts were
contracts of adhesion. Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64
Cal. App. 3d 899, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1976). As contracts of adhesion, arbitration
agreements were vulnerable to being attacked as having been fraudulently in-
duced. On contracts of adhesion, see Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 347
F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1965); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L REV. 629 (1943). But cfi. Berman v. Dean Witter
& Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1003, 119 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (1975) (arbitration compelled
when customer did not show arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion).
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curity" under the federal securities laws.65 Because predispute
arbitration agreements were contrary to rights of customers
under the federal securities laws, customers could avoid arbitra-
tion by alleging a discretionary account. However, commodity ac-
counts are now under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC;66
the customer can no longer avoid arbitration under the federal se-
curities laws.
If one equates voluntariness with "informed" choice, the cus-
tomer now has less opportunity to make a voluntary choice
whether to arbitrate than before section 180.3. The customer will
not know what is involved in choosing arbitration. He will not
have the incentive to seek competent legal advice. Customers do
have incentive to seek competent legal advice after a controversy
has arisen, but by then a customer probably will already have
bound himself to arbitration.
ARBrrRATION VS. REPARATION
Although customers now probably have less real choice about
whether to arbitrate than before section 180.3, the saving grace for
customers is reparation. The CFTC Act of 1974 provides for a rep-
arations procedure by which a customer can obtain compensation
for a broker's violation of the Commodity Exchange Act or any
rule, regulation, or order thereunder.67 Section 180.3 preserves a
customer's right to bring a reparations proceeding by allowing
him to bring the proceeding within forty-five days after notifica-
tion by a brokerage firm that it intends to seek arbitration.
One could expect brokerage firms to use arbitration clauses as a
way of avoiding reparations proceedings. Brokerage firms are
wary of the reparations procedure. Reparations are formal. Deci-
sions are written and published. The reparations procedure is
geared toward giving customers redress for violations of the Com-
modity Exchange Act and rules adopted thereunder. Violations
of the Act and the rules are not to be taken lightly in reparations
proceedings.
The attitude of the brokerage firms was manifested at a CFTC
hearing on arbitration clauses. At the hearing, an attorney for
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974).
66. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
67. Id. § 14.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., allowed that although
a broker had an obligation to inform the customer of the volatile
nature of commodity futures markets, a broker probably did not
have a duty to inform a customer that he was "waiving reparation
or court rights by signing a pre-dispute arbitration agreement." 68
The skirmishing for forum began with the very first reparations
proceeding, Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes, Inc. v. Csaky.69
A customer who opened an account with $25,000 brought a repara-
tions proceeding. He contended that the brokerage firm's em-
ployee had traded the account and caused losses of $56,000 in the
account. The customer refused to pay the $31,000 deficit in his ac-
count, claiming the brokerage firm had mishandled his account.
The brokerage firm filed an arbitration proceeding with the
AAA. On the day before the arbitration hearing, the customer
filed a reparation petition with the CFTC. The customer did not
appear at the arbitration hearing. The arbitrator awarded $31,000
to the brokerage firm.
The brokerage firm obtained a judgment on the arbitration
award in a state court in New York. The brokerage firm then fied
a petition in the United States district court to stay the repara-
tions proceeding which was then pending before the CFTC. How-
ever, District Court Judge Stewart denied the brokerage firm's
petition. He assumed that because the amount in controversy ex-
ceeded $15,000, the controversy was not subject to arbitration.
This assumption was based on the exemption from exchange ar-
bitration of any claim in excess of $15,000.70 However, the court
did not on that ground deny the petition because the court con-
sidered this question one that should be decided in the first in-
stance by the CFTC. Instead, the court based its decision on the
lack of any provision in the Federal Arbitration Act 7 l to stay ad-
ministrative proceedings. "The lack of such a provision is consis-
tent with a long-standing policy of hesitancy to interfere with
administrative proceedings before all administrative remedies
have been exhausted."7 2
Deference to the jurisdiction of the CFTC was evident in other
cases in which brokers sought to compel arbitration. In Bache
Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. French,73 Judge Sirica of the United States
68. [1976] 18 Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 7.
69. [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,270 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
70. 7 U.S.C. § 5a(11) (1976).
71. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
72. [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,471 (citations
omitted).
73. Id. 20,249 (D.D.C. 1977).
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District Court for the District of Columbia refused to order a cus-
tomer to proceed with arbitration and refused to enjoin the cus-
tomer from proceeding with a reparations proceeding. Judge
Sirica based his decision on the ground that ordering arbitration
would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Com-
modity Exchange Act. In Milani v. ContiCommodity Services,
Inc.,74 Judge Weigel of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California refused to compel arbitration on
the ground that the policy of protecting investors prevailed over
the policy of favoring arbitration. Judge Weigel found a prohibi-
tion against predispute arbitration agreements that paralleled the
prohibition against such agreements for securities accounts.
75
The deference shown by some courts to CFTC jurisdiction,
however, has not been evident in other cases. In Shearson Hay-
den Stone, Inc. v. Lumber Merchants, Inc.,76 Judge King of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
refused to stay litigation pending determination of the customer's
reparations proceeding. The court based its decision on the lack
of authority requiring courts to defer to the CFTC and on the fact
that the issues involved in the liquidation of the account were
well within the expertise of the court to resolve.
In Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc.,7 7 a customer filed an ac-
tion in court to litigate a dispute arising out of market positions
that had been liquidated after the customer did not meet a mar-
gin call. The brokerage firm made a written demand for arbitra-
tion and brought a motion to stay the litigation.
The customer argued that if the CFTC Act of 1974 prohibited an
exchange from utilizing involuntary arbitration procedures, a
member of an exchange was under a like prohibition. The court
rejected the customer's argument and stayed the litigation pend-
ing conclusion of the arbitration. Judge Robinson reasoned that
the prohibition of the Act applied only to exchange arbitration
procedures; nonexchange arbitration was not affected.78
74. Id. 20,227 (N.). Cal. 1976).
75. Accord, Ables v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., [1975-77 Transfer Binder]
Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,266 (D.C. Wash. 1976). Contra, Ames v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-77 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) T 20,283 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
76. [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,588 (S.D. Fla.
1976).
77. 415 F. Supp. 535 (D.C. Neb. 1976).
78. Id. at 538.
In passing, Judge Robinson stated that in an action not arising
out of a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act but rather out
of a violation of common law, a litigant would have a right under
the seventh amendment to a trial by jury. Because the repara-
tions procedure under the CFTC Act of 1974 did not provide for a
trial by jury, Judge Robinson concluded that the courts rather
than the CFTC would have jurisdiction over common law
claims.
79
The Arkoosh and Lumber Merchants decisions show how
brokerage firms may be able to preclude customers from repara-
tions proceedings. If a brokerage firm can convince a court that
its claim against a customer is a common law claim as opposed to
a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act, a court can either or-
der that the claim be arbitrated or retain jurisdiction to decide the
controversy itself. Although the judges in Arkoosh and Lumber
Merchants did not go so far as to say that they would stay the
CFTC from deciding a controversy involving a common law claim,
such a position would be the logical result of their decisions.
Otherwise, concurrent proceedings could come to conflicting deci-
sions on the same dispute. When the court appeared unwilling to
defer to the administrative tribunal, this potential conflict com-
pelled the CFTC administrative law judge in Lumber Merchants
to resolve an impasse by dismissing the reparations proceeding.8 0
The Arkoosh and Lumber Merchants decisions are predicated
on a clear dichotomy between disputes under the common law
and those under the Commodity Exchange Act. But there is no
such clear dichotomy: A controversy can involve both common
law and Commodity Exchange Act claims. Brokerage firms typi-
cally contend that customers owe money on a deficit incurred on
a customer's account.8 ' Such a debt can be pleaded as a breach of
contract or as a common count. Customers typically contend that
brokerage firms are liable for fraud under the Commodity Ex-
change Act or rules promulgated under the Act. Because both
common law and statutory claims can be involved in a dispute,
the decisions in Arkoosh and Lumber Merchants raise the spectre
of concurrent and potentially conflicting proceedings.
79. Id. at 540. Cf. Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, [Current Binder] Cohiw. Fur. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,506 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (CFTC argued that a broker gives up right to a
jury trial by choosing to engage in a business activity subject to comprehensive
regulatory scheme. Judge Flaum declined to decide issue because of review pro-
vided under the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 18g). See generally Schneider, Commodities Law
and Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 6 HOFSTRA L REV. 129 (1977).
80. Lumber Merchants, Inc. v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., [Current Binder]
Copmm. Fu r. L. REP. (CCH) 120,408 (CFTC 1977).
81. See Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
120, 142-43 (1977).
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The sensible course would be for the courts to defer to the ju-
risdiction of the CFTC. Under its reparations procedure, the
CFTC decides preliminarily whether a reparations complaint al-
leges a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act.82 If the CFTC
decides that plaintiff has not alleged a wrong under the Commod-
ity Exchange Act, a court can proceed. If the CFTC decides that
plaintiff has alleged a violation of the Act, the courts should hold
any litigation in abeyance until it is shown that any decision
which a court could make would not conflict with any decision the
CFTC could make.83
Before the CFTC Act of 1974, the United States Supreme Court
referred antitrust cases to the primary jurisdiction of the Com-
modity Exchange Authority based on a general policy of deferring
to the expertise of regulatory agencies.84 In creating the repara-
tions procedure in 1974, Congress created a special tribunal to
give effect to the rights of customers under the Commodity Ex-
change Act. This specific mandate is certainly a more compelling
reason to defer to the jurisdiction of the CFTC than a general pol-
icy of deferring to the expertise of regulatory agencies. By not de-
ferring to the jurisdiction of the CFTC, the courts can thwart the
intent of Congress. The appellate courts should decide that the
courts must defer to the primary jurisdiction of the CFTC.
CONCLUSION
Although Congress intended section 5a of the CFTC Act of 1974
to break the chains of arbitration agreements, the CFTC rule sec-
tion 180.3 has strengthened those chains. It is now far more diffi-
cult for the customer to avoid the arbitration agreement he has
signed. If a customer wants to avoid arbitration, he will be forced
to choose reparation. In cases that do not involve flagrant fraud,
reparation before the CFTC should be better for a customer than
a remedy through the courts. However, in cases involving flagrant
fraud, a customer may have grounds for punitive damages;8 5 and
82. 17 C.F.R. § 12.22 (1978).
83. Cf. Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (court or-
dered arbitration of common law claims but stayed arbitration of common law
claims until nonarbitrable federal securities fraud claims were decided).
84. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973); Ricci v. Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
85. No reported cases include an award of punitive damages for fraud involv-
ing commodity futures transactions. However, the author has tried cases in which
punitives were awarded for fraud and churning. Previte v. Lincolnwood, Inc., No.
one administrative law judge has held that a customer cannot ob-
tain punitive damages in a reparations proceeding.86 Although
conceivably a customer could bring an action for exemplary dam-
ages in court concurrently with a reparations proceeding, the le-
gal87 and practical impediments to dual proceedings would be
formidable. Therefore, one effect of the section 180.3 caveat will
be to insulate brokerage firms from exemplary damages.
Another effect of section 180.3 has serious implications for the
future. If the CFTC can so facilely circumvent the intent of Con-
gress by the section 180.3 caveat, no reason exists why the CFTC
cannot use the same ploy to allow brokers to bind customers to
arbitration to the exclusion of reparation. No statutory protection
prevents waiver of the right to reparation. The protection of a
customer's access to reparation is only through CFTC regula-
tion.88
Because customers should prefer reparation to arbitration, one
can anticipate that many actions that otherwise would be filed in
court will be filed as reparations. As the CFTC case load in-
creases, the pressure to relieve the burden of a heavy case load
will increase. Should the CFTC decide that reparations have be-
come too burdensome, it could relieve itself of this burden by pro-
viding customers with a "voluntary" choice between arbitration
and reparation. One can be certain that brokers will be lobbying
for a regulation that will enable a customer to waive his right to
reparation. Perhaps it is too soon for the CFTC to consider al-
lowing customers to choose arbitration to the exclusion of repara-
tion, but in time?89 The life cycle of administrative agencies in
261861 (Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, Cal. 1971) (actual damages of $65,058 and
punitives of $50,000) (reported on other issues at 48 Cal. App. 3d 976, 122 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1975)); Conley v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., No. C-31189 (Dist. Ct. of
Sedgwick County, Kan. 1974) (actual damages of $31,000 and punitives of $70,000).
86. Barker v. Commodity Management Syss., Inc., [Current Binder] CoMM.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,432 (CFTC 1977).
87. Under Reg. § 12.21 (7), a petition for reparation must allege "that no arbi-
tration proceeding or civil court litigation, based on the same facts set forth and
against the same parties named as respondents in the complaint, has been insti-
tuted or is presently pending." 17 C.F.R. § 12.21 (7) (1978).
88. Romnes v. Bache & Co., [Current Binder] Comi. FuT. L REP. (CCH) 1
20,535 (W.). Wisc. 1977).
89. The pressure is already building. In February 1978 the Whitten Report dis-
cussed the case load of reparations proceedings:
The Chief Administrative Law Judge advised the Investigative Staff that
he estimated that each judge can handle 25 reparations cases per year,
giving his office a total capability of 100 such cases per year based on the
present staff of 4 judges ....
The Chief Administrative Law Judge subsequently revised his estimate
from 25 to 50 reparations cases which each judge can handle per year.
Thus, the backlog of 285 reparations cases as of September 30, 1977, would
represent a workload of either 2.85 or 1.43 years depending on which esti-
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Washington begins with the vigor of youth but fades away into
regulatory senility.9 0 A young and virile CFTC may have already
established the precedent for an old and tired CFTC to destroy its
reparation jurisdiction.
mate is accurate .... The Chief Administrative Law Judge advised the In-
vestigative Staff that a fifth judge has been included in the fiscal year 1979
budget. This would give a maximum capability of 250 reparations cases
per year based on the more optimistic estimate. Thus even with an addi-
tional Administrative Law Judge, the backlog ... can be expected to
grow.
See SUBCOMM. ON AGRICULTURE AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATIVE STUDY ON
THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 112 (Comm. Print 1978).
The CFTC expects to receive 1000 reparations complaints in 1978. See SENATE
COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION 16 (1978).
90. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS By INDEPENDENT COMnISSIONS
74-95 (1966).

